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The success of the U.S. strategy of nonparticipation in the Law of the Sea
Convention is dependent on the future course of the general international law of
the sea. Mr. Malone expresses confidence that U.S. interests will be protected.' I
am not that sanguine. My analysis of the situation leads me to believe that the
U.S. refusal to participate in the Convention will have a mixed impact on U.S.
interests. On balance, the United States is likely to be worse off as a result of its
refusal to participate. Those adverse consequences, however, would be aggravated
if the Convention were not to come into force at all.
At the present time some basic facts are known. The new Convention will be
signed by a large number of states, many of which will not be from the Third
World. They will include the U.S.S.R. and all other socialist states associated with
it as well as China. Developed countries such as France and Japan will'also sign.
At present, however, the United States has firmly decided not to sign the Conven-
tion. Argentina and Venezuela also appear committed not to sign. The only other
major powers which may not sign are the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany. Signature does not guarantee that the Convention will
come into force or that all the signing states will become parties. It does, however,
create a substantial possibility that the Convention will enter into force.
The United States recognizes that the new Convention text is not all bad. In
fact, it appears to be satisfied with all aspects of the Convention except for the
deep seabed portion of the text. It hopes that large segments of the Convention
will ultimately merge into general international law. Thus, the United States
could enjoy the benefit of many of the Convention's rules without being obligated
to conform to its other unacceptable ones. 2
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II
RULES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAN",
To determine how U.S. interests in the oceans may fare if the United States is
not a party to the Convention, the present state of the relevant general interna-
tional law of the sea must be considered, as well as likely future changes in that
law. The rules of public international law which provide for the development of
general international law through international negotiations is critical in this
regard. Rules found in an international agreement may contribute to general
international law. Such new general law would not only be applicable to states
that are parties to the relevant agreement but also to states that are not parties.
Nevertheless, not all new rules created by international agreements find their way
into general international law.
It is clear that provisions found within international agreements that require
the creation of international machinery, such as international organizations or dis-
pute settlement forums, are not suitable for incorporation as new norms of general
international law. Other provisions, not requiring such machinery, might form or
add to the development of general international law if the rules were found to rise
above the quid pro quo of the international agreement.
The key court opinion on this subject is the North Sea Con/mhen/al She/f Cases3
which arose in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of the law of
the sea. One question presented to the court was whether the equidistance rule
found in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf4 articulated a norm of
international law applicable to states not party to that Convention. 5 In the course
of deciding that the equidistance line was not mandated by general international
law, the court discussed criteria for evaluating when such a rule may become a
norm of international law.
There are three ways in which a rule found in an international agreement
might be relevant to a search for general international law. First, the rule might be
a codification of a preexisting norm of international law. In that circumstance,
international practice outside of the agreement must be considered in order to
determine whether the norm exists in general international law.6 Second, the rule
might serve the function of bringing into existence a norm that is in the formative
stages of development in international practice. 7 Thus, the articulation of the
norm in the agreement and the subscription to the norm by the parties to the
agreement may provide the final elements needed to crystallize prior real world
circumstances and to give birth to a new norm of international law. Third, the
agreement might develop a new norm of international law which, once subscribed
3 (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
4. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
311.
5. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 19-24 (judgment of
Feb. 20).
6. Id. at 37-38: see also H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LA""' AND CODIFICATION 80-81
(1972).
7. 1969 I.C.J. at 37-38; see also H. THIRLWAY, supra note 6, at 80-81.
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to by the states party to the agreement, might initiate a series of actions outside the
agreement that would give rise to a general legal obligation.,
The court found that the equidistance rule met none of these requirements. It
was neither a codification of a preexisting norm, nor was it the final crystallization
of a new emerging rule of customary international law. It failed the first and
second tests because a review of the negotiating history showed that the rule was
put forward as a new development and not as an articulation of a rule that was
generally accepted or was already in the process of being accepted by the interna-
tional community. 9
The court did not even find that the equidistance rule in the Convention initi-
ated the development of a new norm. Primary consideration was given to the
question of whether the rule stated in the Convention was fundamentally norm-
creating in character, so that it could form the basis for a general rule of law.
While the court found that the rule appeared to meet that test on its face, the
context in which it was found and subsequent practice in the real world precluded
such a conclusion.' 0 In particular, the court found that the special circumstances
exception to the equidistance rule established that the rule did not constitute a
general obligation in all circumstances. I I In further support of this conclusion, the
court noted that agreements could supersede the rule and that reservations were
permitted.12
In considering subsequent practice, the court found that most delimitations of
continental shelf boundaries had been determined on the basis of equidistance.'
Nevertheless, the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence that a legal
obligation existed. It focused particularly on the practice of those states whose
interests were specifically affected by the rule. The practice of using equidistance
was not found to be sufficiently extensive or uniform to establish that the interna-
tional community recognized that a rule of law or legal obligation existed. 14
8. 1969 I.C.J. at 37, 41: see also H. THIRLWAY, supra note 6, at 81.
D'Amato disagrees with the author and argues that treaties create international law at the moment of
ratification, rather than upon subsequent developments after ratification. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPTF O-
Ctso.1t IN INrERNATIONAL LAW 107, 164 (1972) [hereinafter cited as A. D'AMATO, THE CONcE t1 OF
CusToM). .ee also H. THIRLWAY, supra note 6, at 81-84: Akehurst, Custom as a Source ofInternational Lau. 47
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1974-75); Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECEIL DES COuRS 31 (1970). In a more
recent article. D'Amato appears to recognize that the passage of time may be necessary. D'Amato. The
Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1110, 1146 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights].
9. 1969 I.C.J. at 41, 45.
10. Id. at 43-45; see also A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, sypra note 8, at 110-12. 120-21.
11. 1969 I.C.J. at 43-45.
12. Id. at 42; see also A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 8, at I 11.
13. 1969 I.C.J. at 43.
14. Id. at 44-45. D'Amato interprets the North Sea Continental Shef Cases as creating a test of"manifest
intent" for determining the effect of a treaty on international customary law. Under this test, the structure
of a treaty must be examined to establish whether certain provisions of the treaty manifest an intent to be
generalized into rules of international law. According to D'Amato, in the ,Vorth Sea Continental Shelf Cases
the equidistance rule was found not to have created international law because the obligation to use the
method was secondary to an obligation to attempt delimitation by agreement, and because the method was
subject to the 'special circumstances" exception. In addition, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf provided for possible reservations against any articles except articles I to 3. D'Amato argues
that the Convention is thus internally divided between the first three articles and all the rest. so that only
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Thus, those who seek to argue that new rules found in the new Convention on
the Law of the Sea will find their way into public international law have a heavy
burden. This burden, however, is not insurmountable. International agreements
have established general international law in the past. 15 For example, before the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' 6 became effective, it was considered to
state some generally applicable rules of public international law. ' 7 The human
rights conventions have arguably created a customary law of human rights.' 8
More recently, Judge Oda, in his highly relevant dissent to the judgment in the
Case Concermng the Continental Shelf, 9 argued that parts of the Law of the Sea Con-
vention had already merged into general international law. 20 Finally, the new
tentative draft of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the UnitedStates directly addresses this issue. In an introductory note to the
section on the law of the sea the editors wrote:
Except with respect to [the deep seabed part] of the Draft Convention, this Restatement, in
general, accepts the Draft Convention as codifying the customary international law of the
sea, and as law of the United States. In a few instances, however, provisions of the Draft
Convention may be at variance with United States law or with the United States under-
standing of customary international law, and in such cases the Restatement reflects the
domestic United States law or the United States view of international law.
2 1
It should be pointed out, however, that this restatement is only in a tentative draft
and has not been adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI). Furthermore,
when the Reporter introduced this tentative draft to the ALI, its submission was
qualified by the assumption that the Convention, then only in draft form, would
be accepted by the United States. 2 2
III
ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS
Many U.S. interests are affected by the law of the sea. The following review of
those interests and the likely future course of customary international law will be
the first three articles express general norms of international law, while the remainder involve particular
rules for the parties. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 8, at 109-11.
15. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 8. at 121-22. See generaIl/j id at 104-05.
D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights, supra note 8, at 1129-39.
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedforsignature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention], reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'i. L. 875 (1969).
17. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18 (judgment of Feb. 2) (article 67 of the
Vienna Convention was found to apply as a codification of prior law); Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 46-47
(Advisory Opinion of June 21) (article 60 of the Vienna Convention was held applicable as a codification
of existing law); see also L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAl. LAw CASES
AND MATERIALS 580 (2d ed. 1980).
18. See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 517-18. 522
(1973); D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights, supra note 8; Schwelb, The International Court ojustice and the
Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (1972).
19. (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Judgment of Feb. 24).
20. Id at 170-71, 228-31, 233 (Oda, J., dissenting); see also id at 38 (judgment ofcourt),eprintedm 21
I.L.M. 225, 235 (1982).
21. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 55-56 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1982).
22. See Statement of Professor Louis Henkin, 59 A.L.I. PROC. 190-91 (1982) (Professor Henkin stated
that future developments might require that the tentative draft be reconsidered).
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limited to five areas that are considered to be particularly significant: scientific
research, marine environment, ocean boundaries, freedoms of the seas, and
resource exploitation.
It is certainly very difficult to predict the way that international law will
develop and how a specific state's interests will fare in the future. Despite these
uncertainties, it is necessary that one make an attempt to predict the future course
of events because those events will determine whether the U.S. decision not to
participate in the Convention is correct. Such projections must form an essential
basis for any state's decision to participate in the Convention.
A. Scientific Research
Presently, U.S. scientists find it difficult to conduct scientific research off the
coasts of foreign countries. A large number of coastal states require that permis-
sion be obtained before research is conducted in or above any zone of national
jurisdiction. The Convention on the Continental Shelf requires consent for
research on the continental shelf.2 3 This approach has generally been expanded to
the 200-mile resource zones claimed by coastal states. 24 The new Convention,
however, would establish technical rules which would maximize the chances for
consent to be granted.2 5 In fact, if the coastal state failed to respond to a request
for consent, consent would be implied. 26 These provisions are a result of quid pro
quo arrangements to effect a change in the public international law of the conti-
nental shelf. Thus, they are neither a codification of a norm nor a crystallization
of an emerging rule of customary law. Absent an obligation in the Convention, it
is likely that permission to conduct scientific research will be increasingly difficult
to obtain under general international law.
Mr. Malone recognizes this problem of consent but argues that in the future,
the United States will conduct marine scientific research under an expanding
number of bilateral and regional agreements. 27 While this will occur, it does not
appear likely that the ready access sought by the United States will be realized by
this procedure. Access under regional and bilateral agreements has been available
to marine scientists for many years. Such arrangements have not been sufficient in
the past, and there is no tangible evidence supporting the view that they will be
any more productive in the future. Sovereignty interests and the suspicion of for-
eign research will continue to be major factors for coastal states in their decisions
to regulate foreign vessels conducting marine scientific research in their zones of
national jurisdiction. Thus, it appears that U.S. scientific research interests will be
worse off if the United States remains outside of the new Convention.
23. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
24. See FREEDOM OF OCEANIC RESEARCH (W. Wooster ed. 1973); Jacobson, Marine Scientift Research
Under Emerging Ocean Law, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 187 (1981).
25. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122
(1982), arts. 245-55 [hereinafter cited as Convention], reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
26. Id art. 252.
27. Malone, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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B. The Marine Environment
Most of the Convention provisions on the marine environment are hortatory,2 8
although they do contain some very progressive language -for example, the defi-
nition of pollution2 9 and the establishment of general goals and procedures for the
protection of the marine environment. 30 At best, these provisions can serve as a
source for progressive development of the law. Their norm-creating nature is in
some doubt, however, because of provisions that allow exceptional treatment for
various countries due to their economic and geographic circumstances. 3 1 More
significantly, however, most of the marine environment portions of the text rely on
other international forums for definition and implementation in the future. 32 The
failure of the United States to sign the new Convention would not necessarily pre-
clude the United States from participating in the more specialized agencies. In
fact, some specialized agencies already exist and enjoy the participation of the
-United States.33
The United States may obtain the benefits of a cleaner ocean even if it is not a
party to the new Convention. If there is widespread participation in the Conven-
tion, the environment provisions would be operative and the marine environment
would therefore be benefited, regardless of U.S. participation. If the new Conven-
tion never comes into force, however, other states would not be obliged or
encouraged to abide by its provisions. In that case, the marine environment might
become more polluted.
Perhaps the most significant marine environment provisions in the Convention
provide for limited coastal state jurisdiction over vessels in zones of national juris-
diction when such vessels threaten the marine environment. 34 The special jurisdic-
tion provisions represent a delicate balance of interests between the environment,
national sovereignty, and the freedom of navigation. The contractual nature of
those articles would be difficult to translate into general norms of international
law. In the absence of limitations set by the Convention, the coastal states would
be likely to assert greater control over vessels found in these zones. Such coastal
state assertions of jurisdiction might protect the marine environment better in
some circumstances. That result, however, would be produced at a cost to other
freedoms of the seas. Thus, if the Convention were to enter into force without U.S.
participation, this country's interests in the marine environment may not suffer
substantially. The adverse impact on other U.S. interests in the seas-navigation,
for example-may be more significant.
28. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 25, arts. 194-96.
29. Id. art. 1(4).
30. Id arts. 192, 206-07.
31. Id. art. 194(1).
32. Id arts. 207-12.
33. See, e.g., id arts. 197-273 (note the references to "competent international organizations" and
"international rules and standards"). See generally Schneider, Prevention of Polluton from Vessels or Don't Give
(o the Ship, in THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES 7 (J. Charney ed. 1982);
Thacher & Meith, Approaches to Regiona/ Marine Problems: A Progress Report on VNEP's Regional Seas Prograrn, 2
OCEAN Y.B. 153 (1980); Waldichuk, ControlofMarne Pollution: An Essay Review, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J.
269 (1977).
34. Convention, supra note 25, arts. 218-20.
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C. Boundaries in the Seas
The U.S. interest in the ocean boundary issues at the Conference was founded
upon three objectives. First, it sought to limit the seaward extent of national juris-
diction in the oceans in order to limit encroachments on traditional high seas free-
doms. Second, it sought to establish the legitimacy of U.S. claims of jurisdiction
over valuable living and nonliving resources in the oceans adjacent to the U.S.
coast. Third, it sought boundary rules and dispute settlement mechanisms that
would avoid or resolve international boundary disputes, particularly those
involving the United States.
The new Convention does serve the first U.S. interest in this area. It limits the
further seaward extension of coastal state jurisdiction. 35 This goal eluded the com-
munity of nations at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in
the mid 1950's and prompted the second Conference in 1960.36 Unfortunately, the
second attempt to fix those limits also failed. 3 7 Seaward extension of coastal state
jurisdiction has now been limited by the new Convention text, but, absent wide-
spread participation, it is unlikely that those limits will find their way into general
international law. If participation is widespread, then the Convention limitations
would benefit the United States whether or not it joins in the Convention.
Customary law development has assured the protection of the second U.S.
interest. The United States claims both a 200-mile fisheries zone and jurisdiction
over the resources of the entire continental margin. Both of these claims are or will
shortly be well protected by customary international law and by the terms of the
new Convention. 38
The new Convention presents a limited advance for the third U.S. interest in
avoiding and resolving boundary disputes. Specific dispute settlement mecha-
nisms established by the text would encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes
which arise. 39 Agreement on the limits of the territorial sea, the economic zone,
and the continental shelf provide the technical basis for boundary delimitations,
although details may provide a fertile area for limited disputes.4 0 By far the most
contentious boundary issue concerns boundaries between opposite and adjacent
states.4 1 Unfortunately, the text does not provide a formula that would lessen the
35. Id arts. 3, 33, 57, 76.
36. See A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 135-59 (1981); Larsen, Forward,
11 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 1, 1 (1982).
37. A. HOLLICK, supra note 36, at 135-59.
38. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 228-31, 233 (Judgment of
Feb. 24) (Oda, J., dissenting); Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(1976); Convention, supra note 25, arts. 55-57, 76-77.
39. Convention, supra note 25, pt. XV.
40. See, e.g., id. art. 76.
41. See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Judgment of Feb.
24); North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 20),
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Gr. Brit. v. Fr.), 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 3 (1977) (under the
Arbitration Agreement of July 10, 1975), reprinted t 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979). A dispute has recently arisen
between the United States and Canada that promises to be equally contentious--delimitation of the Mari-
time Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (memorials were submitted to the International Court of Justice
on Sept. 27, 1982; these memorials are currently unavailable).
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potential for those disputes. 42 Accordingly, the text represents only a limited
advancement of the U.S. interest in the resolution of boundary disputes.
Because the resource claims of the United States are assured whether or not it
participates in the Convention, the Convention's primary benefit to the United
States in this area would be the establishment of maximum limits on national
jurisdiction. Although the participation of the United States is not necessary for it
to reap the benefit of many of the new jurisdictional limits, such limits could only
be established as general international law if the Convention receives widespread
participation.
D. Freedoms of the Seas
For both military and commercial reasons, 43 the major and most pervasive
U.S. interest in the law of the sea is the freedom to use and navigate the seas. The
United States is a major trading nation and has maintained an interest in assuring
its military mobility throughout the world. The freedom of the seas is critical to
these interests.
Since World War II, the law of the sea has seen a massive expansion of coastal
state jurisdiction over the waters adjacent to their shores. 44 While many of these
new zones have been claimed for limited resource purposes, an inevitable result of
the so-called doctrine of creeping jurisdiction is that there will be domestic pres-
sure to expand the scope of coastal state jurisdiction in these zones. The new Con-
vention provides a counterbalance to such domestic pressure by preserving many
of the traditional uses of those waters. The text accomplishes this counterbalance
through many subtle provisions that were hammered out in the course of the nego-
tiations. 45 The subtlety and complexity of these provisions make it unlikely that
their essence could be successfully translated into general international law. Cer-
tainly, in the absence of the Convention, the domestic pressure in many states for
expanded coastal state jurisdiction would probably prejudice that balance.
The problem of creeping jurisdiction is particularly acute in territorial sea
straits used for international navigation. The United States and the Soviet Union
stimulated efforts which led to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) because they believed that the traditional regime of innocent pas-
sage46 through straits did not give them sufficient freedom to use such straits for
passage in the face of expanded territorial sea claims. 4 7 Questions have arisen con-
cerning the right and conditions of passage for warships, nuclear powered vessels,
42. See Convention, supra note 25, arts. 74, 83.
43. See Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am. J.
INT'L L. 77 (1980); Reisman, The Regime of Strais and National Security. An Appraisal of International Law-
making, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (1980); Richardson, Power, Mobih'ty and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN AFF.
902 (1980). Contra Darman, The Law of the Sea. Rethinking US Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 373 (1978).
44. See R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES: ECONOMICS AND LAW OF THE SEA
(1979); Burke, National Legislation on Ocean Authority Zones and Contemporary Law of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L.J. 289 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 25, arts. 55-56, 58-59.
46. See 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zones, arts. 14-23, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
47. See supra note 43.
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submarines, and super tankers. Aircraft have no right of innocent passage. 48 The
regime of transit passage through straits was created in the Convention to protect
the transit interests of the United States and other countries.4 9 That regime was a
product of intense negotiations with the straits states and was reluctantly accepted
by them. The Convention describes the rights and obligations of the states bor-
dering such straits and of the transiting vessels in a detailed eight-article part of
the Convention. 50
The agreement on the regime of transit passage was viewed by the United
States as a major accomplishment of the UNCLOS III negotiations, since the pro-
tection of its navigational interests in such straits is of substantial importance.",
Even though the United States has decided not to participate in the Convention, it
contends that its transit interests through such straits will nevertheless be protected
as a matter of law. The United States presents four arguments in support of this
conclusion, none of which is compelling.
The first argument appears to be that in the absence of a right of passage, no
state has a right to claim a territorial sea in excess of three nautical miles from the
coastline, particularly as opposed to the United States. This argument relies on
the proposition that new international law cannot develop in the face of active
opposition by a major state. 52 Along similar lines, the active opposition of the
United States to an expansion of the breadth of the territorial sea would arguably
prevent the application of the new rule to the United States. If the territorial sea
were thereby limited to three nautical miles, a route of high seas would exist in the
key straits, and U.S. interests in free transit through straits would be protected.
Neither of these arguments is likely to prevail. It is simply inconceivable that the
United States could establish that public international law restricts a nation's ter-
ritorial seas claim to three nautical miles. The United States is virtually isolated in
that view. The overwhelming preponderance of coastal states claim territorial seas
of twelve nautical miles or more.5 3 A rollback of those claims appears impossible.
The view that such claims would not be applicable to the United States due to
its objections does have support, however, in the ICJ's decision in Fsherz'esJursdzc-
tzon (UK v. Ice.).54 The court held that the United Kingdom's objection to the
expanded Icelandic fifty-mile fishery zone made that claim not opposable to the
United Kingdom.5 5  Unfortunately, in subsequent actual practice, Iceland
expanded its fisheries zone to 200 nautical miles from which the United Kingdom
was excluded.5 6 Since state practice is a stronger source of public international
48. See id
49. See id
50. Convention, supra note 25, arts. 34-45
51. See Moore, supra note 43; Richardson, supra note 43.
52. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 131 (Tent. Draft No. 1. 1980) (United States
not considered bound by a rule of international law or by an international agreement if it disassociated
itself during the process of formation).
53. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 36, NATIONAL CL-AINIS TO MARITIME JURIS-
DICTION (4th Revision May 1, 1981); Burke, supra note 44; Moore, supra note 43, at 86.
54. 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18 (Judgment of Feb. 2).
55. Id
56. Anand, A New Legal Orderfor Fisheries, II OCEAN DEv'. & IN I"L L.J. 265, 280 (1982).
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law than judicial opinion, the precedent of the ICJ opinion appears questionable.
More importantly, theory aside, the practical lesson of the Iceland case is that
expanded zones of national jurisdiction in the oceans will be enforced against
objecting states.
The second argument put forward by the United States is that, historically,
customary international law has recognized a special transit right through interna-
tional straits regardless of the zone of national jurisdiction claimed by the straits
states. Since vessels transited such straits traditionally, the practice has given rise
to a special regime that cannot be prejudiced.
An analysis of this argument requires that one distinguish among different
straits. There are those straits which narrow to a point where the distance between
opposing shores is no more than six nautical miles. Such straits have been tradi-
tionally within the territorial sea of the coastal state even under the conservative
view of the United States. As such, transit through such straits has been governed
by the regime of nonsuspendable innocent passage. Such a regime is found in
customary international law and is codified in the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 57 Heretofore, no arguments have been made that
this regime has evolved in favor of greater transit rights. Such an expansion is
envisioned in the new Convention through the application of the new regime of
transit passage.
Another category of straits are those which are sufficiently wide so that the
territorial sea claimed is not broad enough to close a navigation corridor of high
seas through the strait. In those straits passage is predicated on the regime of the
high seas. Such passage could not form the basis for a new rule of passage which
limits the scope of territorial sea jurisdiction in straits. There is no evidence to
suggest that coastal states have been reluctant to claim extensive territorial juris-
diction in straits due to claims of transit rights by foreign states.
The third category of straits presents the more interesting situation. Such
straits would be those that never narrow to six nautical miles but have been sub-
ject to claims of territorial sea that eliminate a corridor of high seas for through
navigation. The question arises whether such straits are burdened with the right
of a transiting vessel similar to the right of transit passage found in the Conven-
tion. If such a right exists it must be derived from customary international law.
Thus, there must be state practice over time consistent with such a norm, acquies-
cence in the normative rule, and a developed sense of obligation to abide by the
rule as a matter of law.
To establish the practice supporting a right of transit passage, one may only
look to the practice with respect to this last category of straits. The case for this
rule has not been fully presented. While it is sometimes asserted that the United
States has been acting on this claimed right, 58 these actions are not well known. It
is not clear that there is a relative uniformity of practice by all interested nations
57. See, e.g., Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of Apr. 9); 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 16, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
58. See Moore, supra note 43, at 86-87.
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pursuant to such a rule. It is not even clear that the rule has been actually articu-
lated as such. Nor has the acquiescence of the international community, not to
speak of the relevant straits states, been obtained. While this approach is certainly
legitimate and a potentially productive vehicle for protecting U.S. straits interest,
the limited information available on this claim suggests, prima facie, that the pur-
ported norm does not exist today.59
The third argument avoids the pitfalls of the second by contending that the
Convention text on transit passage provides the vehicle for the emergence of a new
rule of customary international law. Arguably, the practice of free transit passage
exists, and the transit passage rule in the Convention plus its adoption at
UNCLOS III have provided the basis for the norm. The text seemingly supports
this proposition since it recognizes the right of transit passage for "all ships and
aircraft" 6 and thus does not distinguish between parties and nonparties. The dif-
ficulty with this third argument arises from the intense negotiations which took
place at the Conference on the right of transit passage. These negotiations resulted
in a quid pro quo arrangement containing detailed obligations which are imposed
on the coastal state and the transiting vessel. There does not appear to be a nor-
mative rule that would be susceptible of ready translation into general interna-
tional law. Perhaps a more simplified general rule would have been more
amenable to such an application.6 1
The emergence of the Convention might give rise to the development of a right
of transit passage under future public international law. The norm would be
articulated by the Convention, and state practice could create the necessary cir-
cumstances for new customary international law. The law of transit passage might
develop rapidly, but there will be obstacles to that development. In light of the
domestic sovereignty interests of the states bordering straits which may conflict
with the interests of the transiting vessels, it would be difficult to find the virtual
uniformity of practice by the states specifically affected by the rule (as called for by
the ICJ) which is necessary to form the transit passage rule as general international
law.
The fourth U.S. argument states that once the Convention enters into force,
nonparties would be able to claim the rights of transit passage as third party bene-
ficiaries of the transit passage provisions. Such a benefit might be established. It
should be noted, however, that this theory specifically relies on the participation in
the Convention of the states bordering the straits in question. The "all ships and
aircraft" language may support this conclusion.6 2 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties requires, however, that the "parties to the treaty intend the provi-
sion to" establish third party rights or obligations. 63 Such an intention may be
59. The weakness of this approach and its inherent difficulties are briefly mentioned in Moore, supra
note 43.
60. Convention, supra note 25, art. 38(1).
61. Reisman identifies this problem and suggests that the language of the Camp David Agreement of
1978 that addresses straits passage would have been amenable to this process. Reisman, supra note 43, at
76.
62. See Convention, supra note 25, art. 38(i)
63. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 35.
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difficult to prove.
In addition to the above arguments, U.S. interests in transit passage might
benefit from the entry into force of the Convention in a nonlegal way. These bene-
fits could result from performance under the Convention which does not discrimi-
nate between parties and nonparties. Thus, transit passage through straits under
the Convention might create a situation in which most (but not virtually all)
straits states do not actively check the nationality of ships and aircraft in passage.
Such might be the case in normal circumstances, but in abnormal crisis situations
the absence of treaty rights could produce critical differences in treatment. It is
during such a crisis that the United States has the greatest need for the protections
found in the Convention.6 4
A more direct method of protecting the U.S. interest would be to secure the key
straits politically or militarily. Such a situation could put Indonesia (on the Strait
of Malacca), and Spain and Morocco (on the Strait of Gibraltar), among other
states, in key bargaining positions. The cost of maintaining friendly governments
in those locations or creating new law by force may be far higher than the cost of
participation in the new Convention. In fact, success in the efforts to directly guar-
antee access outside of the Convention could not even be assured.
The above analysis indicates that the United States is taking a substantial risk
by proceeding outside of the Convention, especially in straits covered by the Con-
vention transit passage regime. That risk may be somewhat ameliorated if the
Convention comes into force, even if the United States is not a party.
E. Resource Exploitation
1. Living Resources. The Convention essentially codifies or crystallizes significant
aspects of developing international law relevant to the exploitation of living
marine resources. 65 That law now permits coastal states to claim resource zofies of
up to 200 nautical miles from their coastlines. While the new Convention does
provide certain resource exploitation standards and procedures, they are largely
hortatory. Interested nations are required to reach other more specific agreements
in the future.66 These provisions may encourage more rational and fair manage-
ment of marine living resources. In all likelihood, however, coastal state jurisdic-
tion to regulate the exploitation of living marine resources in zones of national
jurisdiction will be virtually complete regardless of the fate of the Convention. 67
Much will depend, therefore, on the good will and particular interests of indi-
vidual coastal states. Since the new Convention does seek to moderate coastal
state control it may provide some limited benefits to the U.S. distant water fishing
fleets which are not likely to be available outside of the Convention. 68
64. See supra note 43. The Falklands Islands incident has demonstrated that it is relatively easy for
countries of all sizes to employ "smart" missiles to successfully attack or deter even the most advanced
vessels.
65. Convention, supra note 25, arts. 55-63.
66. See, e.g., id arts. 63(2), 64(l), 66(5), 67(3), 69, 70.
67. See Burke, US Fisher, Management and the New Law of the Sea, 76 Am. J. INT"L L. 24, 53-54 (1982).
68. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 25, art. 64.
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2. Hydrocarbons. The major U.S. interest in ocean mineral resources involves the
exploitation of hydrocarbons. For the foreseeable future, the ocean source of those
hydrocarbons will be the subsoil of the continental margin. The only significant
question directly related to hydrocarbons which was addressed at UNCLOS III
concerned the seaward extent of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental
margin. The new Convention places that boundary at the seaward limit of the
margin. 9 That limit appears to conform with developing international law. The
Convention, however, provides a technical method which purports to fix the limit
permanently. It is unlikely that this technical rule and the procedures for its
implementation would form the basis for a general norm of international law.70
Consequently, failure to participate in the Convention may lead to boundary dis-
putes in the future. Similarly, by appearing to fix the limit permanently, the sea-
ward movement of coastal state jurisdiction might be stopped at least for the
foreseeable future. In the absence of a binding convention, it is likely that the
seaward movement of national jurisdiction would not even be slowed. While a
further expansion of resource jurisdiction would appeal to many coastal states, it
would threaten other interests of the United States and other commercial and mili-
tary users of the seas.
The Convention does provide for a limited sharing of revenues from the seabed
beyond 200 nautical miles.7 ' Such a provision is an unlikely candidate for incor-
poration into general international law. The avoidance of such a sharing arrange-
ment may appear to be a direct advantage to the United States. In reality, even if
all states participated in the Convention, it is unlikely that significant funds would
be subject to this provision.
3. Manganese Nodules. Virtually all of the public's attention has been focused on
the regime for the deep seabed because the negotiation of the deep seabed regime
pitted the developed world against the Third World on a resource question. These
negotiations produced an elaborate deep seabed mining regime with an interna-
tional organization and an international entity. Both were created to exploit the
resources of the deep seabed in parallel with other private and state business
entities. 7
2
Certainly, an obligation to create or join an international organization would
not be likely to find its way into a rule of general international law. 73 On the
other hand, an obligation not to exploit the deep seabed resources outside of a
general international agreement might form the basis of international law on the
subject. Arguments that this second obligation creates a basis for international law
arise from normative statements found in the Convention as well as U.N. resolu-
tions, resolutions of other international organizations, the negotiating history of
69. Id art. 76.
70. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 233 (Judgment of Feb. 24)
(Oda, J., dissenting).
71. Convention, supra note 25, art. 82.
72. Id pt. XI, arts. 156-70.
73. See A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 8, at 106.
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the Conference, and state practices up to this date 4 (no commercial exploitation
has yet been conducted). The United States and others contend, however, that the
freedom of the high seas applies and that the primarily interested nations have not
subscribed to this change in the applicable law of the freedom of the high seas.
The United States and others have rejected this rule by enacting deep seabed
mining legislation and by permitting companies with their nationality to prospect
for manganese nodules in the deep seabed.7 5
There is reason to believe that this issue might find its way to the ICJ in the not
too distant future, perhaps as a request for an advisory opinion. 7  The result of
such a case would be difficult to predict. Unlike the Nor/h Sea Contnenta! She/I"
Cases, strong international political interests are involved. Nevertheless, there is a
chance that the United States and its supporters might win the argument on the
law as long as they continue to maintain their position and take action to enforce
their views. It is more likely, however, that a clear ruling in favor of the U.S.
position will not be obtained from the court.
Even if the rule of law were found to generally support the United States, it
would be a pyrrhic victory, at best. The United States would not be any closer to
the exploitation of deep seabed manganese nodules by private enterprise without
substantial financial and political support from the government.
This conclusion is based on three facts:
1. The economics of the technology do not justify private investment in the
commercial exploitation of manganese nodules today regardless of the politico-
legal situation. The economic viability of the industry apparently will be ques-
tionable for some time. 77
2. The legal uncertainty and the strong political objections to exploitation
74. See infia note 75.
75. For the arguments in favor of a customary law right to exploit deep seabed resources, see T.
KRONMILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING (1980): Arrow, The Cus/oma;r onr [ioress, and
the Deep Seabed, 9 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 1 (198 1); Burton. Freedom oj/he Seas. International ar 4-1pp/ abl/e
to Deep Seabed y1ining Claims, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1135 (1977). For the opposing view. see Biggs. Deep Seabed
Mhining and [Jnilateral Legislation, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT"'L L.J. 223 (1980): Letter front the Group of Legal
Experts on the Question of Unilateral Legislation to the Chairman of the Group of 77 (April 23, 1979), 2
OCEAN Y.B. 462 (1980) (Int'l Ocean Inst.) [hereinafter cited as Letterl. On June 28. 1980, President Carter
signed into law the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (Supp. IX 1980).
France (Fr.), West Germany (V. Ger), Japan, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) have all recently adopted their own deep seabed iining laws: (X\V. (;er) Act
of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, English trans/ation appears in 20 I.L.I. 393 (1981): (\. ;er)
Act to Amend the Act of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, Enghsh transla/tin appears in 21 IL.I
832 (1982); (U.K.) Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981. reprintedin 20 I.L.NI. 1217 (1981):
(U.S.S.R.) Edict on Provisional Measures to Regulate Soviet Enterprises for the Exploration and Exploita-
tion of Mineral Resources, English translation appears in 21 I.L.M. 551 (1982). (Fr.) Law on the Exploration
and Exploitation of the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, Enghsh translation appeas in 21 I.L.M. 808
(1982); (Japan) Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining (July 16, 1982), Fn4'gsh /;anslatoni
appears in 22 I.L.M. 102 (1983); (Japan) Enforcement of the Regulations for the Lasw on Interim Measures
for Deep Seabed Mining, Official Register of the Ministry of International Trade and lndustr,. No. 9770
(July 26, 1982).
76. AM. BRANCH OF THE INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF TiE COMII-T1.1E ()N TIlE LAWV (* I TiE Si.t
98 (1982).
77. See President's Statement, supra note 2, at 888. Address by Marne Dubs, 15th Annual Conference
of the Law of the Sea Institute (June 21, 1982) (Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada),fizhconimn in I'R :. L. S.:,
INST. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Dubs].
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outside of the Convention increase the economic risks to the potential exploiters.
Direct and indirect retaliation against participants, including the participating
financial institutions, would be possible. 78 The potential confiscation of the prod-
ucts of the exploitation would present a significant risk. 79 It is now likely that a
number of nations would take these actions because recent events have produced
an extreme politicization of the issue.
3. Assuming that deep seabed mining takes place, it would appear that the
regime of the high seas would not provide the necessary security of tenure. There
would be no guarantee that an exploiter would be able to work its mine site
without the risk of claim jumpers and the presence of other impediments to its
work. A mini-treaty with some developed country participation would be of little
aid in the absence of the U.S.S.R., France, and Japan.8 0 There is even the possi-
bility that other exploiters might be sponsored by India, Brazil, the Enterprise (to
be established by the Convention),8 1 or some flag of the convenience states. Any
one of those potential exploiters may assert rights in conflict with deep seabed
mining activities conducted outside of the Convention. That conflict might be
created for economic, political, or lawmaking purposes.
As a consequence, if the United States wants to encourage deep seabed mining
outside of the Convention, it will be required to provide economic support to
improve the financial prospects of the industry, and to insure against risks inherent
in the high seas regime. It must also invest significant political effort to prevent
retaliatory actions; it may even be required to provide military protection to the
operations at the mine site. If the United States were to persevere over the long
term, it might even be able to forge a new consensus on the law for the deep
seabed.
Serious questions are raised about the deep seabed regime found in the Con-
vention. It is argued that the regime will be inefficient and that it may not provide
sufficient assurance of access to the resources or full security of tenure.8 2 The text
may also force participants to sell technology to other potential deep seabed
miners, a procedure that is not desired by the industry but which does have prece-
78. See Convention, supra note 25, art. 137(l); Letter, supra note 61, at 465.
79. Convention,supra note 25, art. 137(1): Letter, supra note 75, at 465. see also Conventionsu/na note
25, arts. 134(2), 137(3).
80. See Burton, supra note 75. On September 2, 1982, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States signed an agreement entitled Agreement Concerning Interim
Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed, Sept. 2, 1982. 21/1.L.M. zeptnled m
21 I.L.M. 950 (1982). The United States has indicated that this agreement represents the first step towards
a mini-treaty outside of the Convention. The Agreement merely provides for a method of settling disputes
where there are overlapping deep seabed claims under domestic legislation. As such it is consistent with
the Convention. In fact, resolution 11, paragraph 5, of UNCLOS III specifically calls for such an arrange-
ment. Furthermore. France voted for the adoption of the Convention and has indicated its intention to
sign.
81. See Convention, supra note 25, art. 170, Annex IV.
82. See Law of the Sea, Hearings on .Status of the Lau of the Sea Treat), Vegati ltons Belbre the 5"ibcvmm. On
Oceanographir o the House Comm. on .4terchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-35. 39 (1982)
(attachments to statement of Marne A. Dubs. Kennecott Corp.) [hereinafter cited as Hearingsi I President's
Statement. supra note 2, at 887-88: Malone's Statement, August 12, 1982, CURR NT POi(t:Y N). 41v, LAW
()F T'HF SE A AND OCEANS POLiY(: 3. Dubs. supra note 77.
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dent. 3 Those arguments avoid the real question: would U.S. industry be able to
participate in deep seabed mining under either regime in the foreseeable future
absent substantial economic and political support from the United States govern-
ment? Since the answer to that question is "no," one must determine the relative
costs to the United States of sponsoring deep seabed mining. Such costs must be
measured in the form of direct expenditures and hidden or indirect political and
military efforts. That calculation must then be considered in the context of the
entire law of the sea interests of the United States. Two countries seriously inter-
ested in deep seabed mining, France and Japan, have apparently made a prelimi-
nary calculation and have concluded that the Convention presents, on balance,
the better route. It is hard to see why the United States calculation should be
different.
In sum, the resource interest of the United States in fisheries would be slightly
better served under the new Convention; the same is true for the hydrocarbon
interest. In the case of deep seabed mining, the choice between proceeding under
the Convention or outside of it presents a close question. The deep seabed mining
interest is, at present, minor because of the limited prospects for deep seabed
mining in the foreseeable future. Consequently, one would not have expected that
the U.S. choice between participation and nonparticipation in the Convention
would have been as significantly influenced as it was by the deep seabed mining
regime set out in the Convention.
This short review of substantive U.S. interests in the law of the sea indicates
that all would not be lost if the United States were not to participate. Nonpartici-
pation, however, would impose costs on those substantive interests which do not
appear to be counterbalanced by benefits for other substantive interests. Thus,
there would be significant adverse impacts on the U.S. interests in marine scientific
research, the maintenance of transit, and other freedoms of the seas. Some losses
would be felt with respect to the interest in the marine environment, boundaries in
the seas, and interests in the living resources. If the Convention were never to
come into force and receive widespread participation, the adverse impact on the
United States would be more substantial. The deep seabed mining interest may
be a close call. Even if the deep seabed interest favored nonparticipation, how-
ever, on balance the real substantive interests of the United States would argue in
favor of participation.
IV
ANALYSIS OF OTHER U.S. INTERESTS
The participation issue also hinges on some broader issues outside of the sub-
stance of the Convention. The interests of the United States in avoiding interna-
tional conflict and maintaining stable rules of international behavior must be
83- Se Convention, supra note 25, annex IIl, art. 5, President's Statement,.upm note 2, at 888: Hear-
ings. supra note 82, at 29-30, 41-64 (statement and attachments of Richard A. Legatski, National Ocean
Industries Ass'n). Seegenerally Fv'ynpostum: Transnational Technology Tranjifr:. Curreni Problems and S&.l/on,. /fi the
(opoalt Prac/,ttner, 14 VAND. J. TRANSN.\-'i. L. 249 (1981).
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considered. There are political and economic costs to the government and
industry of the United States when international law is uncertain. International
law provides stability and conflict avoidance mechanisms that serve to advance
U.S. interests across the board. The new Convention provides the benefits of sta-
bility and conflict avoidance through the creation of binding rules of behavior and
particular dispute settlement mechanisms. 8 4 Failure to participate in the new
Convention is likely to prejudice U.S. interests in the law of the sea as well as harm
the overall position of the United States in the international community.
It is argued that U.S. participation in this Convention would set a bad prece-
dent. The precedent issue must be divided into three parts: the negotiating pro-
cess, the substance of the negotiations, and the credibility of the United States.
The precedential effect of UNCLOS III on the utility of major universal negotia-
tions to resolve international issues is clear. Universal negotiations as seen at
UNCLOS III were not successful regardless of the product or even the particular
procedures used. 85 The negotiations simply took too long, were too costly, and
,produced too little to be used again in the near future. The international commu-
nity will have to rethink its approach to major international legal and political
issues that require universal settlement.
The substantive precedent is also limited, but it is not necessarily adverse to
U.S. interests. If one focuses on the non-deep-seabed portions of the text, the pre-
cedent is positive. The parties directly addressed substantive issues and sought to
resolve them primarily along pragmatic lines. The deep seabed negotiations were
different. They involved highly charged issues of the New International Economic
Order (NIEO) and questions of resource exploitation. In that arena, the product
appears to be an agreement that places some of the political objectives of the
NIEO into convention language."6 It also creates what appears to be a cumber-
some bureaucracy and state-like enterprise. The deep seabed regime was the
product of hard fought negotiations conducted in the context of the entire
UNCLOS III. As such, it was the unique result of the quid pro quo of those negoti-
ations and stands as no generalizable precedent to be used in other settings. Fur-
thermore, the facial appearance of the regime is deceiving. In reality, the regime
may actually function in a way comparable to a private enterprise system subject
to normal government regulations.8 7 Consequently, it does not appear that this
constitutes a substantial precedent that is adverse to U.S. interests.
The third aspect of the precedent issue concerns the U.S. refusal to participate
in this Convention and its impact on future negotiations. It can be argued that
refusal to participate will strengthen the U.S. hand at other forums. This result,
84. Convention, supra note 25, arts. 186-91, 286-99, annexes \'-VIII.
85. See Charney, Tehnology, and International Aegottions, 76 Art. J. INT'L L. 78 (1982).
86. See, e.g., Convention,supra note 25, Preamble, arts. 140, 143-44, 148, 150-52, 159-62, 164, 170, 202,
203. 266-77, annex III, arts. 5-13, 15, annex IV. See generaly Charney. Laiu, of the Sea: Breaing the Dead/ock,
55 FOREIGN AFF. 598 (1977); Juda, U VCLOS Ill and the New Inlternaltional Eonomic Order. 7 OCE-AN 1)-. &
lNxr'. L.J. 221 (1979).
87. US Foreign Poliy and the Lau, of the Sea, Hearings Be/bre the House Comm. on Foreign .-t'lau.. 97th
Cong.. 2d Sess. 89-94 (1982) (statement of Elliot L. Richardson). Hearings, supra note 82, at 224-28 (state-
ment of Leigh R. Ratiner).
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however, is dependent upon substantive issues. If it were clear that the U.S.
refusal to participate is founded upon a realistic evaluation of U.S. interests, then
other negotiation partners would realize that the United States will stand behind
its interests. If the U.S. action is not based upon a fully reasoned and consistent
analysis of its interests, the lesson to others is that the United States is an unreason-
able and unpredictable negotiating partner. Such a conclusion would have an
adverse impact on U.S. credibility at other international negotiations. It appears
from the foregoing analysis that the precedent of U.S. nonparticipation in the
instant case would be adverse to the United States.
V
CONCLUSION
Nonparticipation in the Convention would, on balance, have an adverse
impact on the substantive interests of the United States, as well as on its interest in
maintaining stable international law and avoiding international conflict. The
United States ought to have pursued the goal of participation in the new Conven-
tion. Even if it is not a party, the United States would gain substantially from the
Convention's entry into force. Current administration efforts appear to be aimed
at preventing the Convention from coming into force. That is a mistake which
should be corrected in short order.
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